It is essential to recall, for example, that under the Customs Union Protocol, one of the main pillars outlined therein for implementation and which constitutes a sine qua non of any Customs Union, was the institution of a Single Customs Territory.
And the logic for it is simple. Transit goods across the customs union territory cannot rightly be allowed to move from the point of entry, whether a port, airport or road border post, without taxes having been collected on behalf of the ultimate receiving Partner State where the goods are destined. For two years Tanzania stalled to implement the system.
Yet one of the paradoxes arising from such stand is that immediately upon President John Pombe Magufuli becoming President, he discerned that the transit goods system had in fact being seriously abused by leading Tanzanian traders to evade taxes.
Goods declared as ‘transit cargo’ were being off-loaded within Tanzanian territory without any taxes having been paid and the goods being sold at huge profits by the traders.
And this is precisely what the single customs territory was and is intended to arrest. One could rightly ask whether the delay to implement the single customs territory agreement in Tanzania had actually not been a deliberate rent seeking scheme by political and public officials.
Equally, there are a number of other EAC integration programmes which met with little implementation enthusiasm from Tanzania. These included: the joint implementation of the Kenya-Uganda Northern Railway and the Tanzania Central Railway Corridor Projects, both with links to Rwanda and Burundi and whose central objective was to introduce a standard gauge railway system.
Other projects involved the introduction of a single tourist visa equivalent to the European Union (EU) ‘Schengen’ visa and the use of a National Identity Card for enabling easier cross-border movement of EAC citizens.
Moreover, and to add salt to injury, Tanzania championed accusations against Rwanda for allegedly supporting M23 belligerents who were striving to overthrow the Kabila regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Presidents Jakaya Kikwete and Paul Kagame, in that accusatory scenario, were brought onto a regrettable diplomatic ‘shoot-out! The end result was bad blood and huge scars being caused between Tanzania and Rwanda.
The follow-up expulsions by Tanzania of the so-called Rwandan illegal immigrants living in Tanzania under the ‘Operation Kimbunga’ in mid-2013 almost certainly heightened the love lost between Rwanda and Tanzania. Put differently, the die for the EAC’s future had, for a time, been cast as a result of the Rwanda-Tanzania fall-out.
Emergence of Coalition of the Willing
Such was the environment that gave birth to what came to be described as ‘a two-speed EAC’ and the ‘coalition of the willing’. Yet, the inevitability of such ‘unintended consequence’ to Tanzania’s visible loss of enthusiasm and commitment to shared EAC integration projects could not be otherwise.
The other EAC Partner States (minus Burundi which seemed caught up between its own internal political crises and trying to play a ‘do-gooder’ to Tanzania- a strategic supporter of the Pierre Nkurunziza regime from the time of CNDD’s armed struggle leading to the ‘Arusha Accord’ of July, 1992) had to get on with realizing the EAC objectives of deeper and wider integration.
Moreover, the EAC Treaty (Article 7 (1) (c)) allows a select number of Partner States to apply the principle of ‘variable geometry’ to set aside the application of the Treaty principle of ‘consensus’ decision making (Articles 12 (3) and 15 (4)) to proceed to implement projects on their own provided that they fall within the Treaty objectives and co-operation programmes of the EAC (Chapters 11-27).
Let the truth be told: between 2012 and 2014 Tanzania was on the verge of what one may describe as a ‘Tanzexit’ (exit of Tanzania from the EAC). Tanzanian Members of Parliament harped on the floor of the legislative house about Tanzania exiting the EAC to focus on SADC and even establish a new regional bloc with Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And by the end of 2015, Tanzania’s commitment to the EAC seemed nothing short of a mere lip service. The body language of its leaders expressed it all.
Fatigue in EAC Integration?
It is evident though that some form of fatigue about traditional trade and economic integration seems to be emerging and the openness of globalization with the interconnectedness it offers appears to dampen the logic of institutional integration arrangements. The surge of sovereignty versus some form of supra-nationality which fundamentally underlies any meaningful integration is evident around the world, not simply in the EAC.
In addition, there is the entry of new policy dynamics that seem to summon greater and more urgent attention and concern in international co-operation. These dynamics centre more on threats of terrorism and new forms of 21st century insecurities such as cybercrime than on the lack of or dilution of deeper and wider institutional trade and economic alliances.
The pertinent question is whether the EAC leadership is well seized of such new developments and would promote new forms of co-operation as inherent part of deepening and widening integration taking into account security threats for which the region has already paid a huge price in recent years.
Enter the ‘Political Dragon’- Magufuli
It is in the overall context of the foregoing that the idea that the EAC may now be at a ‘tipping point’ emerges. It is an idea that flows from a broad view that the entry of the Tanzanian ‘political dragon’ in the name of President John Pombe Magufuli into the EAC arena presents a dynamic opportunity for the EAC to move onto a new threshold and critical mass in its integration scheme of things. It is an idea that is well supported by a dramatic shift in power relations among the EAC Heads of State.
The new Tanzania President is manifesting a different view and posture, not only in relation to regional integration but also in relation to overall relations with cross- border neighbours who share so much cultural affinity as to make past policies like ‘Operation Kimbunga’ regrettable.
For, in contrast to the past few years when the relationships of the EAC leaders appeared to be subtly driven by some form of ‘competition’ over how the international community assessed their performance at national state levels and thereby catapulting a strange negative form of ‘intransigence’ in supporting EAC regional projects and programmes, a new chapter of relationships appears to be opening.
Thus, it is not surprising to hear President Paul Kagame observing at the end of the World Economic Forum Summit for Africa held in Kigali from May11-13, 2016 that ‘a new era has unfolded between Tanzania and Rwanda. Following the opening of the new chapter, the two countries are going to implement major development undertakings.’
Mark the words: ‘a new era’ and ‘a new chapter’! Viewed in perspective, the entry of President Magufuli into the political landscape is a startling sign of how zeitgeist can change the political climate. What defines workable regional integration is precisely what is now taking place between Rwanda and Tanzania; the building of an environment of trust and cohesion. This is the recipe for creating sustainable shared values and the promotion of lasting mutually beneficial cooperation.
We are thus seeing a new chapter in the EAC overall that is underpinned by mutual respect, trust and solidarity much as some of the media in Kenya appears well bent to build an unfortunate hype about President Magufuli not being openly supportive or aligned to Uhuru Kenyatta’s leadership ostensibly because of his close friendship with Raila Odinga. It is a hype which is potentially dangerous for EAC’s cohesion and must be admonished.
EAC’s New Competitions-Justifiable?
It is also important to see the recent decision by the Ugandan government to build its oil pipeline across the Tanzanian territory, instead of Kenya’s, in the correct context. The decision by Uganda, in our view, is surely not about favouring Tanzania because of the past support Tanzania extended to President Museveni in overthrowing Idi Amin as irresponsibly tooted in some of the Tanzania media! Neither is the decision directed at leveraging Tanzania’s economy. If anything, the decision is simply in favour of Uganda for the economic sense of it.
However, and I find this point to be missed in all the analyses about the Ugandan oil pipeline project as well as the decision by Rwanda to make greater use of the Dar es Salaam port for its exports and imports trade. The point is: both the Ugandan and Rwandan decisions are fundamentally in the interest of promoting EAC integration.
What is ordinarily not realized is that Uganda’s decision on the oil-pipeline and Rwanda’s decision to export and import most of its goods through the Dar es Salaam port, first, help to build and ingrain greater confidence in Tanzania on EAC integration which is crucial. Secondly, the whole EAC region will benefit from the economic spill-overs from the pipeline project as it bolsters trade and economic growth of the EAC states overall.
It thus means that rather than Kenya lamenting loss of business from the Ugandan pipeline project, it should instead celebrate Tanzania’s new found ‘fortunes’ that would ultimately benefit Kenya’s trade fortunes as the lead industrial state in East Africa. The higher the economic growth of the other four EAC Partner States, the greater the inevitable benefit to Kenya for its export of goods and services. This is what a win-win partnership in regional integration is all about.
On another dimension, it is also important to note that Tanzania is a key economic player in the EAC and has the potential to become an economic powerhouse in Africa. It is not therefore in EAC’s interest to leave it in a state of economic zero-sum political mindset. The EAC almost lost it during the last four years. Under President John Pombe Magufuli Tanzania is once again taking leadership in making EAC work and realise deeper and wider integration.
What Would Magufuli Do?
The EAC is thus now poised for a tipping point; it is once again being pushed to rise to a critical mass and threshold. The decision taken by the Magufuli government effective May 20, 2016, that all EAC symbols-emblems, flags and anthem- shall be accorded state recognition and respect in all public offices and functions, which never existed before, is a definitive expression of the changed circumstances.
The EAC is now receiving the due recognition it deserves in Tanzania. It manifestly shows that politics matters and that it is the right leadership that drives right politics.
What then could such new positive leadership environment foster for deepening and widening EAC integration? What can President Magufuli’s entry onto the EAC political leadership stage mean in real terms for pushing the EAC into a higher trajectory of success?
Will he be able to shift gears from what has basically been a lacklustre stance by Tanzania in the past four years and create the enabling conditions and drivers that foster a more robust collective execution of decisions and the implementation of agreed projects and programmes that move the EAC to higher levels of integration?
There are a number of integration issues which if properly approached and quickly decided upon can make EAC become an effective vehicle for transforming the economies of the partner states. For regional integration that works well cannot be reduced to some form of romanticism where leaders use it to project an image of being Pan-Africanist but working against its spirit at its most fertile grassroots level.
In 1963, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere had posited that the EAC would be durable and successful if it ingrained a spirit and culture of ‘East African-ness’. It was an apt remark as he launched the University of East Africa.
That university, by enabling the exchange of students from all the EAC Partner States to the then three public universities of Makerere, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, became the crucible for animating and creating young educated persons who became passionately sold to the dream and future of a united East Africa. That spirit and culture as well as the driving mechanisms can once again be renewed and revitalized.
Conclusion
It cannot be overemphasized that the overarching imperative in making EAC integration more effective is leadership and, particularly so, the leadership of and by the EAC Heads of State. They are supposed to imbibe the character and disposition of leaders like Nyerere whose vision for East Africa was far beyond nationalism.
They need commitment that views the EAC as an essential driver of greater prosperity for its members and who clearly see its weakness as detrimental to the development of the Partner States as a whole. Above all, they are the ones that can override national and sovereignty sentiments and passions that often fall foul with EAC’s quest of the bigger integration picture.
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