WILL justice be done in Guinea in the very sensitive case of the September 28, 2009 massacre of 150 people in a stadium in the capital Conakry? This looks more likely after investigations closed in December 2017 and the suspects were referred for trial, but victims are not so happy.
Firstly, Justice Minister Cheik Sacko is already saying the government does not have the money to hold this trial, which could last 8 to 10 months according to him. So he has thrown the ball into the court of donors, mainly the US and Europe, who have been calling for years for light to be shed on this massacre that the United Nations has called a crime against humanity. Another reason for dissatisfaction is the dropping of charges against two officers who were among the suspects: General Mathurin Bangoura, the current gouvernor of Conakry and former member of the CNDD military junta in power at the time; and Bienvenu Lamah, a captain in the gendarmerie. We should not forget either that the main accused, former junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara, is still in exile in Burkina Faso. The president of the victims' association, Asmaou Diallo, has in any case warned that she will go to an international court if the case does not open in 2018.
There is disappointment in Togo, where transitional justice mechanisms set up to shed light on political violence from 1958 to 2005 have failed. Now the High Commission for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRRUN) -- charged with implementing the recommendations of the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission - knows all it can give victims is money. Judicial complaints sit in drawers at the courts while the perpetrators still have power and still commit crimes. "In Togo, money can easily replace justice," writesJusticeInfo correspondent in Lomé Maxime Domegni.
And what can be said about Burundi, which has been locked in a deep political and human rights crisis since April 2015? Murder, forced disappearance, torture and arbitrary arrest of real and perceived political opponents, journalists and human rights activists continued in 2017, according to the annual report of Human Rights Watch published on January 18. In its determination to continue suppressing the population without the outside world's gaze, the regime of Pierre Nkurunziza has also declared all foreign investigators persona non grata. In Burundi, the first country to pull out of the International Criminal Court, "impunity for serious crimes remains the norm", says Human Rights Watch.
Finally to Tunisia which is still in search of social justice seven years after the January 2011 Revolution. This can be seen from the Fech Nestanaw campaign launched at the beginning of the year. "We are calling for the scrapping of the 2018 Finance Law which has brought a sharp rise in the prices of many basic consumer goods and, in our opinion, will deepen the social divide in Tunisia," explains one of the campaign organizers, Koussai Ben Fradj, who talked to our correspondent Olfa Belhassine.
This is one of the questions posed by David E. Brown, a career American diplomat, in his report “The Challenge of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa,” published in May of this year. The report is a chilling indictment of political and military elites throughout West Africa who are making common cause with drug traffickers and money launderers in order to advance or protect their power and influence.
In regard to Guinea-Conakry — as opposed to Guinea-Bissau which already holds the dubious title of the world’s first “˜narco-state‘ — Brown writes that since “the coup in 2008 there have been reports of Latin American cocaine traders moving in significant numbers to Conakry, where some relatives of the late President Lansana Conté have an established interest in the cocaine trade. In 2010 the U.S. government designated Ousmane Conte, the son of Guinea’s late President, as a Tier 1 kingpin.”
This may appear a shocking development to some, but close observers of the situation, like Brown, are convinced that drugs and politics in West Africa have become intertwined to such an extent that the emergence of three or four more narco-states in the region, some with ties to international terrorist organizations, is not out of the question.
While most of the profits from this business never touch down in Africa, a fair amount is laundered in construction and legitimate businesses in such numbers that some observers cynically reflect that drug money is a net plus for the treasuries of these most impoverished nations.
This kind of thinking fails to take into account the long term effects of corruption and the social costs when drug dealing and drug using become endemic to the transit countries themselves. Already in relatively well off Nigeria and Ghana, drug kingpins have become cultural icons with the result that young people see the drug trade as a legitimate career path out of poverty. It will probably only be a matter of time that a Nollywood version of Jimmy Cliff’s 1972 classic Jamaican spliff film “The Harder They Come“ emerges from the neighborhoods of Lagos and onto the international festival circuit. In the last few years dozens of Nigerian nationals have been arrested for dealing drugs in such far-flung locales as Malaysia, Thailand and India.
For all its countercultural panache, the romanticizing of the drug trade obscures the deleterious effects of civic corruption and fails to address the underlying socio-economic rot which invades poor neighborhoods when drug kingpins and corrupt politicians get together. It also fails to address the threat faced by otherwise peaceful communities when drug gangs join forces with international terrorist organizations seeking to target Western or Israeli interests in their countries.
The Hezbollah connection
These days drugs produced in South America and South Asia are being transshipped to Europe or sold into West African neighborhoods through a wide variety of sources, some with connections to non-state political actors such as Hezbollah who use profits from drug sales to finance operations throughout the world. AQIM, Ansar Dine and the various Taureg elements involved in the civil conflict in Mali have also been accused of using drug profits to buy weapons and political allies.
There is mounting evidence that networks of Lebanese business people in West Africa and South America are using family and commercial ties to raise and launder money for groups such as Hezbollah, which uses the funds for operations in their traditional battle ground of south Lebanon (and now also for operations in Syria as well as across North and West Africa). If Iran ever pulls back from direct support of Hezbollah’s aggressive slate of international adventures, networks of supporters using proceeds from drug sales that are laundered through legitimate businesses such as used car sales will pick up the slack. In Nigeria three Lebanese businessmen are on trial for terrorism related charges after security forces discovered weapons caches that prosecutors are trying to link to a Hezbollah backed plot to attack Israeli and American targets in Nigeria.
In this case drugs are not implicated. Two of the suspects own, respectively, an amusement park and a supermarket.
One of the ironies of the situation is that in West Africa, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda operatives have also been doing deals with Israeli diamond merchants. If there is a buck to be made in the region, the enmities of elsewhere fly out the window. This sorry spectacle was reported on by former Washington Post West African Bureau Chief Douglas Farah in his 2004 book Blood from Stones :
An Israeli diamond dealer, who regularly did business with buyers he knew were Hezbollah and some he suspected were Al Qaeda, agreed. “Here it is business,” he said. “The wars are over there. Here we do business, there they do war.”
Levantine traders have been operating throughout West Africa for over a century. During this era they have built substantial fortunes and bases of political influence which they wield locally (even in places like Liberia which has made it virtually impossible for Lebanese to become citizens without marrying locals) but also back home in Lebanon. It is not surprising that since the Lebanese civil war of the “˜70s and 80’s the fractious politics of the Levant have also washed ashore along the Gulf of Guinea.
Challenges for global security
If ever there was a community that practices the code of omerta it is the Lebanese of West Africa. Even though there is a symbiotic relationship between Lebanese money and African political power, there is nevertheless a stone wall dividing the communities in ways that have led to mutual distrust if not outright rancor. For the most part, the last thing that Lebanese business people in West Africa want is the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency or Interpol showing up at their storefronts searching for money laundering receipts or pictures of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah hanging in their bedrooms. To a large extent the success of Levantine business in West Africa is due to its historically low profile. Now that it is becoming clear that non-state political actors have infiltrated Levantine commercial networks, their preferred level of obscurity is about to be blown open by local prosecutors looking to audit books and warehouses and international security agencies looking to disrupt illicit transnational flows.
It is essential that security and law enforcement personnel looking into these networks not tar the whole community with criminal intent. In some countries Lebanese/African relations can be easily frayed and the Lebanese could easily become targets of demagoguery and victims of violence. This might make them more likely to turn to criminal gangs or organizations like Hezbollah for protection rather than local police.
There also needs to be an effort made to educate and fully support West African journalists — those courageous enough to take on the task — on how to investigate these types of criminal activities and to draw the lines, as in Guinea, between local politicians and international drug traffickers. Due to capacity issues, the media in West Africa is generally unable to carry out investigative reporting on the major links between corruption, drug trafficking and international terrorism. It’s not an easy task, but it’s one that is essential in order to maintain any hope of resistance against the combined power of money, guns and corrupt politics.
As the situation in Mali continues to boil and the conflicts in Nigeria continue to escalate more and more international attention will be drawn to the region. International drug cartels and transnational political actors will find common cause and first-mover advantage in countries like Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, etc. due to their weak legal structures, corrupt politicians, toothless journalism and unprotected borders.
As Brown points out:
“Separatists in Senegal’s Casamance Region are already using the drug trade to finance their rebellion and while they have historically used the sale of cannabis to do so, it is logical to assume that cocaine revenues will eventually contribute to this on-going instability, if they have not already.”
The first task, however, for international security agencies looking into ties between drugs and terror in West Africa is to really find out who is who, what are they doing, who they are connected to and what they are capable of. The complexity of the networks just described requires a level of sophisticated investigation and human intelligence that has heretofore been absent, hence the shock and dismay when Mali began to unravel. Another issue is that local authorities will try to link any threat to their power to “˜outside agitators or criminal conspiracies’ when in fact they may be referring to domestic groups with legitimate political grievances and interests.
Broad brush strokes and aggressive tactics will only exacerbate already complex enmities and might push the currently blameless into the arms of the bad guys. In that scenario nobody wins.
Togo officially the Togolese Republic (French: République togolaise), is a country in West Africa bordered by Ghana to the west, Benin to the east and Burkina Faso to the north. The sovereign state extends south to the Gulf of Guinea, where its capital Lomé is located. Togo covers 57,000 square kilometres (22,008 square miles), making it one of the smallest countries in Africa, with a population of approximately 7.6 million.
From the 11th to the 16th century, various tribes entered the region from all directions. From the 16th century to the 18th century, the coastal region was a major trading center for Europeans to search for slaves, earning Togo and the surrounding region the name "The Slave Coast". In 1884, Germany declared a region including present-day Togo as a protectorate called Togoland. After World War I, rule over Togo was transferred to France. Togo gained its independence from France in 1960. In 1967, Gnassingbé Eyadéma led a successful military coup d'état after which he became president of an anti-communist, single-party state. Eventually in 1993, Eyadéma faced multiparty elections, which were marred by irregularities, and won the presidency three times. At the time of his death, Eyadéma was the longest-serving leader in modern African history, having been president for 38 years. In 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé was elected president.
Togo is a tropical, sub-Saharan nation, whose economy depends highly on agriculture, with a climate that provides good growing seasons. While the official language is French, many other languages are spoken in Togo, particularly those of the Gbe family. The largest religious group in Togo consists of those with indigenous beliefs, and there are significant Christian and Muslim minorities. Togo is a member of the United Nations, African Union, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, Francophonie, and Economic Community of West African States.
Before colonization (-1884)
Archaeological finds indicate that ancient tribes were able to produce pottery and process iron. The name Togo is translated from the Ewe language as "land where lagoons lie". Not much is known of the period before arrival of the Portuguese in 1490. During the period from the 11th century to the 16th century, various tribes entered the region from all directions: the Ewé from the east, and the Mina and Gun from the west. Most of them settled in coastal areas.
The slave trade began in the 16th century, and for the next two hundred years the coastal region was a major trading centre for Europeans in search of slaves, earning Togo and the surrounding region the name "The Slave Coast".
Colonial era (1884–1960)
In 1884, a paper was signed at Togoville with the King Mlapa III, whereby Germany claimed a protectorate over a stretch of territory along the coast and gradually extended its control inland. Its borders were defined after the capture of hinterland by German forces and signing agreements with France and Britain. In 1905, this became the German colony of Togoland. The local population was forced to work, cultivate cotton, coffee and cocoa and pay high taxes. A railway and the port of Lomé were built for export of agricultural products. The Germans introduced modern techniques of cultivation of cocoa, coffee and cotton and developed the infrastructure.
During the First World War, Togoland was invaded by Britain and France, proclaiming the Anglo-French condominium. On 7 December 1916 the condominium collapsed and Togo was divided into British and French zones. 20 July 1922 Great Britain received the League of Nations mandate to govern the western part of Togo and France to govern the eastern part. In 1945, the country received the right to send three representatives to the French parliament.
After World War II, these mandates became UN Trust Territories. The residents of British Togoland voted to join the Gold Coast as part of the new independent nation of Ghana in 1957. French Togoland became an autonomous republic within the French Union in 1959, while France retained the right to control the defense, foreign relations and finances.
Independence to present day (1960–present)
The Togolese Republic was proclaimed on 27 April 1960. In the first presidential elections in 1961, Sylvanus Olympio became the first president, gaining 100 per cent of the vote in elections boycotted by the opposition. On 9 April 1961 the Constitution of the Togolese Republic was adopted, according to which the supreme legislative body was the National Assembly of Togo.
In December 1961, leaders of opposition parties were arrested because they were accused of the preparation of an anti-government conspiracy. A decree was issued on the dissolution of the opposition parties. Olympio tried to reduce dependence on France by establishing cooperation with the United States, Great Britain and Germany. He also rejected efforts of French soldiers who were demobilized after the Algerian War and tried to get a position in the Togolese army. These factors eventually led to a military coup on 13 January 1963, during which he was assassinated by a group of soldiers under the direction of Sergeant Gnassingbé Eyadéma. A state of emergency was declared in Togo.
The military handed over power to an interim government led by Nicolas Grunitzky. In May 1963 Grunitzky was elected President of the Republic. The new leadership pursued a policy of developing relations with France. His main aim was to dampen the divisions between north and south, promulgate a new constitution, and introduce a multiparty system.
Exactly four years later, on 13 January 1967, Eyadéma Gnassingbé overthrew Grunitzky in a bloodless coup and assumed the presidency. He created the Rally of the Togolese People Party, banned activities of other political parties and introduced a one-party system in November 1969. He was reelected in 1979 and 1986. In 1983, the privatization program launched and in 1991 other political parties were allowed. In 1993, the EU froze the partnership, describing Eyadema's re-election in 1993, 1998 and 2003, as a seizure of power. In April 2004, in Brussels, talks were held between the European Union and Togo on the resumption of cooperation.
Eyadéma Gnassingbé suddenly died on 5 February 2005 after 38 years in power, the longest occupation of any dictator in Africa. The military's immediate installation of his son, Faure Gnassingbé, as president provoked widespread international condemnation, except from France. Some democratically elected African leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria supported the move, thereby creating a rift within the African Union.
Gnassingbe left power and held elections, which he won two months later. The opposition declared that the election results were fraudulent. The events of 2005 led to questions regarding the government's commitment to democracy that had been made in an attempt to normalize relations with the EU, which cut off aid in 1993 due to questions about Togo's human rights situation. In addition, up to 400 people were killed in the violence surrounding the presidential elections, according to the UN. Around 40,000 Togolese fled to neighboring countries. Faure Gnassingbé was reelected in 2010 and 2015.
In late 2017, anti-government protests erupted in Togo, the biggest since ones after the 2005 election. They demand the resignation of Gnassingbé, who is part of a family they say has been in power too long. The UN has condemned the resulting crackdown by Togolese security forces, and Gambia's foreign minister, Ousainou Darboe, had to issue a correction after saying that Gnassingbé should resign.
Geography
Togo has an area equal to 56,785 km2 (21,925 sq mi) and is one of the smallest countries in Africa. It borders the Bight of Benin in the south; Ghana lies to the west; Benin to the east; and to the north, Togo is bound by Burkina Faso. Togo lies mostly between latitudes 6° and 11°N, and longitudes 0° and 2°E.
The coast of Togo in the Gulf of Guinea is 56 km long and consists of lagoons with sandy beaches. In the north the land is characterized by a gently rolling savanna in contrast to the center of the country, which is characterized by hills. The south of Togo is characterized by a savanna and woodland plateau which reaches to a coastal plain with extensive lagoons and marshes.
The highest mountain of the country is the Mont Agou at 986 m above sea level. The longest river is the Mono River with a length of 400 km. It runs from north to south.
Climate
The climate is generally tropical with average temperatures ranging from 23 °C (73 °F) on the coast to about 30 °C (86 °F) in the northernmost regions, with a dry climate and characteristics of a tropical savanna. To the south there are two seasons of rain (the first between April and July and the second between September and November), even though the average rainfall is not very high.
The coast of Togo is characterized by marshes and mangroves. High human population growth is leading to rapid deforestation, endangering many species. At least four parks and reserves have been established: Abdoulaye Faunal Reserve, Fazao Malfakassa National Park, Fosse aux Lions National Park, and Kéran National Park. The most frequently observed animals are giraffes, cape buffalo, hyenas, and lions. Few elephants remain. Common birds are storks, cranes and marabou.
Firstly, Justice Minister Cheik Sacko is already saying the government does not have the money to hold this trial, which could last 8 to 10 months according to him. So he has thrown the ball into the court of donors, mainly the US and Europe, who have been calling for years for light to be shed on this massacre that the United Nations has called a crime against humanity. Another reason for dissatisfaction is the dropping of charges against two officers who were among the suspects: General Mathurin Bangoura, the current gouvernor of Conakry and former member of the CNDD military junta in power at the time; and Bienvenu Lamah, a captain in the gendarmerie. We should not forget either that the main accused, former junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara, is still in exile in Burkina Faso. The president of the victims’ association, Asmaou Diallo, has in any case warned that she will go to an international court if the case does not open in 2018.
There is disappointment in Togo, where transitional justice mechanisms set up to shed light on political violence from 1958 to 2005 have failed. Now the High Commission for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRRUN) — charged with implementing the recommendations of the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission – knows all it can give victims is money. Judicial complaints sit in drawers at the courts while the perpetrators still have power and still commit crimes. “In Togo, money can easily replace justice,” writes JusticeInfo correspondent in Lomé Maxime Domegni.
And what can be said about Burundi, which has been locked in a deep political and human rights crisis since April 2015? Murder, forced disappearance, torture and arbitrary arrest of real and perceived political opponents, journalists and human rights activists continued in 2017, according to the annual report of Human Rights Watch published on January 18. In its determination to continue suppressing the population without the outside world’s gaze, the regime of Pierre Nkurunziza has also declared all foreign investigators persona non grata. In Burundi, the first country to pull out of the International Criminal Court, “impunity for serious crimes remains the norm”, says Human Rights Watch.
Finally to Tunisia which is still in search of social justice seven years after the January 2011 Revolution. This can be seen from the Fech Nestanaw campaign launched at the beginning of the year. “We are calling for the scrapping of the 2018 Finance Law which has brought a sharp rise in the prices of many basic consumer goods and, in our opinion, will deepen the social divide in Tunisia,” explains one of the campaign organizers, Koussai Ben Fradj, who talked to our correspondent Olfa Belhassine.
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